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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show how, taken at face value, it appears
that Horkheimer and Adorno’s conception of the culture industry presented in The
Dialectic of Enlightenment does not allow for integral freedom—or the very freedom
which is at the heart of modernity’s conception of the person and is the basis for its
political philosophy. Nevertheless, the text has the resources to support a slightly
less pessimistic reading, and provide a role for irony. That is, once the distinction
between terrible laughter and reconciled laughter as well as terrible and reconciled
humour is understood, the text rewards rational reconstruction to demonstrate the
folly of reason, and in doing so, we might experience Dialectic of Enlightenment
itself as an instance of reconciled humour. Perhaps, the text itself offers a way to
mitigate against Horkheimer and Adorno’s condemnation of the culture industry
so that it is less totalizing than it would first appear. Thus, we interpret Dialectic
of Enlightenment as an exercise in reconciled humour, and not the terrible humour
so frequently found in the culture industry.
I. CULTURE INDUSTRY AS IRON SYSTEM
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment seems to
be an inherently pessimistic text. Western civilization is depicted as an iron
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system where oppression and false consciousness are ubiquitous. This system,
they argue, arises out of the main theoretical foundations of the so-called mod-
ern liberal democratic state, namely the presupposition that human beings
are creatures endowed with reason, and this capacity to reason is essential to
their own governance. The central claim is that Western society has devel-
oped with an over-dependence on logos or instrumental reason at the expense
of a more expanded notion of reason which includes a technical notion of
mimesis. A direct result of modernity’s blind faith in reason is in their words
“disaster triumphant”.1 Given that this text is a response to truly troubling
events—the Nazi concentration camps and Stalinist terror, there would seem
to be no role for laughter in such an iron system. If justice demands that
citizens are granted equal rights based on the conception of the person as
endowed with reason, then how is it possible that citizens are exterminated
and cities are annihilated? Horkheimer and Adorno do not claim that there
is some sort of break between theory and practice, so that it was simply the
case that Hitler and Stalin did not follow the rules, but rather that there
was something within the Enlightenment project itself, broadly conceived as
originating with Homer that can account for this “barbarism”.2 They claim
that the full-force dedication to the ideals of reason which permeates every
aspect of contemporary life creates the grounds for totalitarian regimes or at
the very least for a culture that is rationally assimilated and authoritarian.
The aim of this paper is to show how, taken at face value, it appears that
Horkheimer and Adorno’s conception of the culture industry does not allow
for integral freedom—or the very freedom which is at the heart of moder-
nity’s conception of the person and is the basis for its political philosophy.
Nevertheless, the text has the resources to support a slightly less pessimistic
reading, and provide a role for irony which came to be among prevalent artis-
tic practices for postmodern aesthetics. That is, once the distinction between
terrible laughter and reconciled laughter as well as terrible and reconciled hu-
mour is understood, the text rewards rational reconstruction to demonstrate
the folly of reason, and in doing so, we might experience Dialectic of Enlight-
enment itself as an instance of reconciled humour. Perhaps, the text itself
offers a way to mitigate against Horkheimer and Adorno’s condemnation of
the culture industry so that it is less totalizing than it would first appear.
Therefore, laughter has a critical role in a slightly less pessimistic reading of
the text as once the distinction between reconciled and terrible laughter is
integrated into the text itself, one may interpret Dialectic of Enlightenment
as an exercise in reconciled humour, and not the terrible humour so frequently
found in the culture industry. The freedom involved in this beneficial sort of
humour—reconciled humour—may be fleeting, but it is nevertheless signifi-
cant.
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II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH REASON?
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Diagnosis of the Ills of Instrumental
Rationality
—“The sleep of reason produces nightmares” Francisco de Goya
It is worth noting at the outset that Horkheimer and Adorno conceived of
themselves over and against analytic philosophy, and as such they pride them-
selves on writing philosophical fragments.3 For them, rational connections
between claims in an argument on the one hand embody domination in the
conceptual realm as this is how science dominates nature. On the other hand,
in contrast, fragments embody modernist art which they hold in high regard.
The rhetorical importance of such fragments, given their critique of positivis-
tic reasoning, is that they are not performative contradictions as Habermas
might have us believe.4 That is, if they were to rail against reason by offering
reasons laid out in proof-like precision, then the critique of reason itself would
be at least paradoxical.
Nevertheless, sorting through the labyrinth of their fragments, we can re-
construct their fragmented musings into formal arguments. Moreover, such a
reconstruction may reveal the potential for a devastating critique of an over-
grown logos by being a parody of it. According to our alternative reading of
Dialectic of Enlightenment, a reading which aims at a slightly less pessimistic
interpretation of the culture industry, the first step is to take logos or the ra-
tional aspects of their musings and reconstruct them as basic arguments with
conclusions supported by reasons. In short, this will show us the reasons for
reason’s folly.
The fragment arguments within Dialectic of Enlightenment that demon-
strate this folly provide a reductio ad absurdum to the Enlightenment idea
that reason should always triumph over unreason, allowing us to reach the
conclusion that myth and reason belong together in dialectic, with the aim
that such an extended version of reason is able to integrate its opposite; a
Hegelian (and Freudian) idea. That is, although these qualities are seemingly
opposite and irreconcilable, they should in fact mediate each other. More-
over, if brought together, myth and reason would reconcile the real world and
the intellectual world, manual and intellectual labour, high and low art, and
thereby gives rise to integral freedom.
As is formally required by the reductio ad absurdum and to provide a
rhetorical foil, we begin our creative reconstruction of their argument by
assuming the opposite. The starting place must be an argument for reason
as if reason were all that the Enlightenment had hoped it would be. We may
reconstruct the argument as follows:
1. If the Enlightenment rejects mythology in favour of reason, then reason is
necessary for the pursuit of knowledge and myth is contrary to the pursuit of
knowledge.
2. The purpose of Enlightenment reason is to begin a new era of human
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progress by means of divorcing the intellect from tradition and fantasy in
order to make rational thinking irreconcilable with mythical thinking, more
specifically mythic imagination.
3. Therefore, any society premised on the promise of human progress must
reject myth and solely rely on reason and such an Enlightenment-informed
society would be truly just.
Of course, Horkheimer and Adorno have an idiosyncratic definition of the
Enlightenment which might be roughly thought to correspond with the Greek
term “logos”. They attribute the primacy of reason and the inferiority of
“mythos” to all rationalist philosophers from Plato onwards. It is this central
tenet of the Enlightenment that Horkheimer and Adorno find absurd in many
ways. The next step in a reductio ad absurdum proof is to demonstrate
that the consequences of the previously argued conclusion (3) are absurd,
contradictory, or at least wildly implausible. The next section will describe a
number of absurdities Horkheimer and Adorno find with the assumption that
reason is as powerful as the Enlightenment presupposes in premises (1) & (2)
in the reductio ad absurdum argument.
III. THE ABSURDITY OF AN UNMITIGATED LOGOS
A central part of any reductio ad absurdum argument is the description of
the absurdities inherent in the conditional foregrounding. In order to fully
address what is wrong with reason in late-capitalistic society, Horkheimer and
Adorno describe a number of the paradoxical consequences of taking reason to
be the foundation of a modern civil society. This section is devoted to a close
textual reading and to reconstructing these absurdities described throughout
the Dialectic of Enlightenment. The presentation of these absurdities is not
necessarily in the order of their occurrence within the text, and the arguments
are simply numbered for clarity’s sake. The importance of reconstructing the
philosophical claims as arguments is to demonstrate that logos does play a
critical role in dialectical philosophy, and that it is paradoxically necessary
and potentially self-destructive. In short, this close reading demonstrates
Horkheimer and Adorno’s method of negative dialectics in which “any way of
thinking can turn into its opposite in changed circumstances”.5 Moreover, the
necessity of the conditional makes the five absurdities listed below unavoid-
able, given the power ceded to instrumental rationality.
First, (1) there is the absurdity inherent in the problem of identity which
needs universals or generalizations for the production of knowledge. That is,
if the domain of knowledge is limited to the products of reason, then reason
paradoxically obstructs worldly knowledge or at the very least knowledge of
the sensuous nature of particulars. A paradigm of logic, the Aristotelean
Square of Opposition functions by subsuming particulars under universals.
However, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that this prevents us from knowing
the things-in-themselves or their sensuous nature because what is common to
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all is what is emphasized. Accordingly, ineffable experiences are not candi-
dates for knowledge. For example, reason cannot fully capture the particular
sensation of drinking a cup of coffee or the exact fragrance of the spring-
time air. Horkheimer and Adorno write, “[s]ociety is ruled by equivalence. It
makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities
. . . anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one,
is illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry”.6 The sensuous particu-
lars of the world and the language of metaphor which characterizes sensuous
perceptions and human imagination are neutralized and classified according
to rules and formulas. This perspective took its most severe form in posi-
tivism where that which could not be analyzed logically was not suitable for
philosophical analysis, and thus only to be passed over in silence.
In response to what we call, the first absurdity, Habermas criticized what
seems to be the dismissal of reason and logic, however, if we read the problem
of identity as part of a reductio ad absurdum, then what is wrong isn’t reason
and logic per se, but the way the positivist’s method held that it is the sine
qua non of philosophy.7 Horkheimer and Adorno find this reification of logos
problematic because such a method ignores the social and historical particu-
larity which is where all truth resides. They claim that the positivists, only
to their detriment, focus on universal truths or grist for the mill of instru-
mental reason. Simply creating a system to categorize experience does not
yield real knowledge, only a way to manage information. This management
of information, unjustified by reason, leads to what they will claim as another
absurdity.
A second absurdity, (2), that results from prizing logos to the detriment
of mythos is the putative nature of certainty which ends in the impotence
of reason. Even though reason is the sine qua non of the Enlightenment,
reason cannot justify itself. Horkheimer and Adorno write, “[t]hinking, as
understood by the Enlightenment, is the process of establishing a unified
scientific order and of deriving factual knowledge from principles, whether
these principles are interpreted as arbitrarily posited axioms, innate ideas, or
the highest abstractions. The laws of logic establish the most universal rela-
tionships within the order and define them. Unity lies in self-consistency,”.8
However, just as there is no solution to Hume’s problem of induction, there
is no point at which the whole enterprise itself is justified: “the notion of the
self-understanding of science conflicts with the concept of science itself”.9
Furthermore, reason is not yet triumphant because it cannot account for
unexpected failures: “not only does the expected event fail to occur, but
the unexpected happens; the bridge collapses, the crop fails, the medicine
causes illness,”.10 With these observations, Adorno and Horkheimer seem to
be asking the rhetorical question: if reason and thinking were to be all so
empowering and capable of realizing Enlightenment ideals, then why are we
constantly beleaguered with failure? It is the failure unpredicted that echoes
the failure of reason, and as such it belies Enlightenment’s quest for certainty.
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An apologist for this so-called Enlightenment thinking might note that it
is through failure and the diagnosis of what went wrong that knowledge is
actually furthered. In fact, as A.J Ayer and Karl Popper have argued, one of
the criteria for a proposition’s potential to be considered to be a candidate for
knowledge is that it must be verifiable or falsifiable. However, we can clarify
the more precise objection to logos as I have described it in this reductio
ad absurdum. It is not the case that Horkheimer and Adorno are eschewing
all uses of reason, but simply objecting to instrumental and logical reason’s
status as the only method of philosophy. That is, even if a proposition is
verified, it is far from certain. Even though Descartes’ aim was to provide
one solid foundation for the truth of science, the father of modernity’s goal
in his grounding opus, Meditations on First Philosophy, was ultimately un-
successful. The fatal flaws of solipsism and infinite regress deny the certainty
that Horkheimer and Adorno deem to be a rather shaky foundation which
leads to further absurdity.
A third absurdity (3) we find Horkheimer and Adorno addressing is the
status of thinking itself. The Turing debate raised the question of whether or
not machines could think. If so, then what was once regarded as the essential
feature of a human being, res cogitans, becomes demystified. The metaphys-
ical implication is that what is essential to the human isn’t uniquely human
and can be reduced to a process. The thinking process itself could be more
efficiently handled by computing machines rendering the essential nature of
a human being an insufficient ground for the privileged place modernity ac-
cords the person. Horkheimer and Adorno write, “[t]hought is reified as
autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so
that it can finally be replaced by the machine”.11 If thinking and rationality
are what ground the claim to human rights, and machines can think, then
either machines have rights or else the concept of human rights is dispelled as
another quaint myth. “For enlightenment, anything which does not conform
to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion?.
Its own ideas of human rights then fare no better than the older universals.
Any intellectual resistance it encounters merely increases its strength”.12 Ra-
tionality itself becomes superior even to persons, including those who once
thought that the capacity to reason is humanity’s greatest quality and the
grounds for domination over nature.
A so-called apologist for Enlightenment thinking might retort that reduc-
ing thinking to a process does not devalue humanity as it is not thinking per
se that is replaced by the machine, but rather the ability to follow a set of
instructions. However, the point of the third absurdity still stands because
what is presupposed by liberal democratic theory—the ability to follow laws
as rational constructs—is the same for man and machine. The failure to
abide by those laws is not met with praise, but with punishment and yet
more absurdity.
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The fourth absurdity (4) describes the cumulative effect of a situation
where the political and economic system is held in higher esteem than any
individual human being. For Horkheimer and Adorno rationality entails ad-
herence to a totalizing and oppressive system. It is therefore absurd that ra-
tionality is prized at the expense of humanity. For example, “if, in the absence
of the social subject, the volume of goods took the form of so-called overpro-
duction in domestic economic crises in the preceding period, today, thanks
to the enthronement of powerful groups as that social subject, it is produc-
ing the international threat of fascism: progress is reverting to regression”.13
The absurdity of the so-called “rational economic man” is that the economy
does not function for every person who is rational, and as such creates the
conditions for fascism to flourish. As Bowie notes, “the Holocaust employed
the rationalized means of technologically developed societies to enable what
would otherwise have been impossible. One aspect of this was precisely the
fact that these rationalized means allowed many of those contributing to the
horror to exclude the kind of thoughts and feelings which would have pre-
vented them from contributing”.14 That is, the same method of domination
that Horkheimer and Adorno find within the ethical realm paradoxically leads
to human beings treated as objects instead of subjects. “Not only is domi-
nation paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated
objects, but the relationships of human beings, including the relationship of
individuals to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the objecti-
fication of mind”.15 Hence, the absurdity is that a system founded on the
individual’s capacity to reason ends up using that reason to vitiate the value
of the human being.
A fifth absurdity (5) is that the value of humanity as a whole is reduced
to a utilitarian aggregate. Instrumental rationality prizes the economy of late
capitalism over the intrinsic worth of the person. “Who dies is unimportant;
what matters is the ratio of incidences of death to the liability of the company.
It is the law of large numbers, not the particular case which reoccurs in the
formula”.16 The economy presupposes fungible objects; that is, different items
can be exchanged with a common measure. There is a price for everything,
and if it is thought that human beings are priceless, in terms of the economic
measure it is the same as their being worth nothing. Thus, late-consumer
capitalism either has to deny that there can be a price for human beings
and treat them as worthless or put a price on what ought not to have one.
More generally, they claim that “[r]eason serves as a universal tool for the
fabrication of all other tools, rigidly purpose-driven and as calamitous as the
precisely calculated operations of material production, the results for human
beings escape all calculations”.17 This results in dire consequences for human
beings and for nature. Corporate practices based on instrumental reason do
not have any regard for any intrinsic value in nature, but instead only regard
it as raw material for industry to exploit. “The man of science knows things
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to the extent that he can make them. Their ‘in-itself’ becomes ‘for him’ ”.18
This is ultimately self-destructive as “what human beings seek to learn from
nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings”.19
Thus, they will claim that this totalizing system functions to the detriment
of nature, human beings, and culture itself.
At this point, it is easy to see how interpretations of Horkheimer and
Adorno focus on the devastating, all-encompassing critique of modernity.
However, we should note that this critique derives from a rationalist’s stand-
point in order to show that instrumental reason devours its own children.
The presupposition here is that mythos plays no role in a rationally struc-
tured society, and without mythos, the totalizing effects of logos produce and
reproduce the last absurdity. This is not to say that they will accept a positive
role to a garden-variety myth, but instead will develop a technical account of
mythos as instrumental reason’s counterpart.
The final absurdity (6) of instrumental reason in Horkheimer and Adorno’s
account is the culture industry, for this is what replicates the iron system of
rationally-driven economics. In fact, it is the ultimate absurd consequence
of the Enlightenment project, as it is the embodiment of subsumptive reason
in which differences are ignored as the culture industry “infects everything
with sameness”.20 Under the banners of freedom and choice, individuals are
reduced to marketable groups, thus amounting to a false individuality and an
inorganic culture.
Furthermore, Horkheimer and Adorno claim the devastating efficiency of
a rationally administered culture relies not only on “infecting everything with
sameness” by means of corporate monopolies, the interconnection of different
industries, and the quality of mass art, but also on repressing the imagina-
tion of those who consume culture. “It is not the material preconditions of
fulfillment, unfettered technology as such, which make fulfillment uncertain.
[. . . ] The fault lies in a social context which induces blindness”.21 They see
the culture industry as a totality; that is, “the whole world is made to pass
through the filter of the culture industry”.22 The entertainment offered to con-
sumers as fulfillment and escape from the mechanized work process succeeds
because it “leaves no room for imagination or reflection on the part of the
audience,” thus “stunting the mass media consumers’ powers of imagination
and spontaneity” because “no scope is left for the imagination”.23 The suc-
cessful integration of society into a manipulated whole relies on the success of
instrumental reason by means of repressing its opposite: mythic imagination.
Hence, the inability of individuals to creatively structure and interpret
their lives is the direct result of a “circle of manipulation and retroactive
need in which the system grows ever stronger,” and thus often renders the
political subjects of modern liberal democracies feeling powerless.24 One who
desires to succeed within the culture industry and attain what it promises
must adapt to it, and thus must forfeit his or her claims to the imagination,
that is, to imagine possibilities outside of what the culture industry promises
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and offers. The subsequent inability to imagine anything other than the
culture industry as a genuine possibility for life thus ensures further reliance
on it, and the system grows ever more influential.
With increasing pessimism and perhaps even crankiness, Horkheimer and
Adorno regard the culture of apathy and powerlessness concerning political
life as “intimately bound up with boredom: boredom is objective desperation.
It is also, however, symptomatic of the deformations perpetrated upon man by
the social totality, the most important of which is surely the defamation and
atrophy of the imagination”.25 Bored individuals within the culture industry
find themselves helpless in using their imagination to create and participate
in activities that would make their free time worthwhile, thus they look to
the entertainment offered by the culture industry as a means of escape from
their boredom. As a result, entertainment is often viewed with undue seri-
ousness, and news of actual importance, valuable to the rationally informed
political subject necessary for the liberal democratic state, is often packaged
as entertainment. “Amusement always means putting things out of mind,
forgetting suffering, even when it is on display. At its root is powerlessness.
It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but from the
last thought of resisting that reality”.26 The absurdity of the culture industry
renders making sound and well-informed political judgments irrelevant.
Thus, the absurdities of unmitigated logos, in short, a neglect of myth and
dedication to the ideals of reason, are numerous. From the first absurdity in
which the potential for sensuous knowledge is thwarted by Aristotelian logic
to the ultimate absurdity of the culture industry, Horkheimer and Adorno’s
fragments themselves provide reasons for reason’s folly . Logos results in a
rational loss of individuality and creates a rational domination of nature and
individuals by reducing them to mere economic products. The reduction of
cultural artifacts to mere economic products where efficiency is the measure
of success as is the case in the culture industry shows the failure of modernity
to embrace imagination. It is important to note here that these absurdities do
not lead necessarily to the iron system, but rather they are inherent in the use
of rationality over and above any other. If the conclusion of the reductio ad
absurdum argument is that mythos and logos should temper each other, then
it is mythos which holds the keys to the prison created by the culture indus-
try’s rational disaster. Logos has been shown to be absurd on its own terms;
this self-contradiction is the irrational foundation of modernity. However,
there is a meta-question: What to make of the use of logos to demonstrate its
shortcomings? If reason has the power to show its own deficits, then maybe
it is indeed more powerful than mythos and the iron system is a description
of an inescapable dystopic reality. There is another possible reading which
requires viewing the argumentative form of the reductio ad absurdum as a
rhetorical strategy. We should be careful to note that we are not claiming
that this is what Horkheimer and Adorno intended through their text, but
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instead that the text itself is open to the potential reading; a reading that
may illuminate the prevalence of irony and satire in postmodern aesthetics.
IV. A RHETORICAL ROLE OF THE REDUCTION TO
ABSURDITY
In the previous section, Horkheimer and Adorno’s social critique was recon-
structed as a reductio ad absurdum argument. The view that rationality left
unchecked leads to totalitarian regimes and authoritarian cultures turns on
a causal argument whose key player is instrumental reason. The idea that
a society founded on the power of logos inevitably leads to an authoritarian
iron system commits a number of fallacies—most obviously, the slippery slope
fallacy. At the very least the argument turns on hyperbolic descriptions of
the consequences of subsumptive reason. “Reason” itself seems to be used
ambiguously, as it sometimes refers to mental processes and other times it
refers to the operation of Aristotelean logic, although clearly there is some
connection between the two spheres of reason. The scope and power of their
critique of reason is a matter of interpretative dispute. If interpreted strongly
as a critique of all reason, then their argument is simply self-defeating.27
However, it may very well be that Logos pursued to its extreme is tragi-
cally funny. If we view their extravagant descriptions as a rhetorical flourish,
then we can accept elements of their overall view of society, but stop short
of endorsing the “totalizing disaster triumphant” description of the modern
liberal democratic state.28 This is a novel way of reading Horkheimer and
Adorno as it limits the critique of reason to merely its overpopulation in an
ecosystem that requires both myth and reason. It is an analysis that assumes
that we could construct a meta-level irony to the text. The aim of this al-
ternative reading is to use patient logical analysis to discover the limits of
logic and to use the imagination to piece together Horkheimer and Adorno’s
disparate fragments into a fractured whole that is capable of sustaining a
meta-analysis. This requires us to see Dialectic of Enlightenment as a speech
act and as a representation.
The alternative reading proposed here need not accept Horkheimer and
Adorno’s seeming claim that all uses of Aristotelean logic amount to domi-
nation and that because proof of certainty for most empirical claims is not
forthcoming, reason itself is a failure. This alternative reading can accept the
view that the central argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment starts with the
concept of self-preservation that pushes thinking onto the track of identifi-
cation and domination as we will see in the next section how a more robust
notion of mythos can overcome these tendencies. Furthermore, we do not
have to accept that all modern economic systems must reduce human be-
ings to all and only cogs in a big machine. The leap from a certain form of
reasoning to totalitarian societies is a diagnosis formed on the presumption
that modernity was correct in assuming that logos is a self-sufficient ground-
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ing of a just society. There in fact seems to be a paradoxical relationship
between the individualism prized by most inhabitants of late capitalism and
the prevalence of the policies to support the economic system at the cost
of the individual. There is wide spread societal acceptance, say for exam-
ple, that corporations should lay-off people if it maximizes their profit mar-
gins. The same tension pervades contemporary discussions of human rights.
Horkheimer and Adorno’s description of a society that purports that individ-
ual rights and freedoms are important, yet supports policies that undercut
the value of those rights and freedoms seems quite accurate even today as
the debates surrounding a global refugee crisis gives rise to policies in some
countries that restrict freedom in the name of so-called “security.”
Horkheimer and Adorno note the consequences for the imagination that
“just as prohibition has always ensured the admission of the poisonous prod-
uct, the blocking of the theoretical imagination has paved the way for polit-
ical delusion, they are deprived by the mechanisms of censorship, both the
external ones and those implanted with them, of the means of resisting it”.29
Freedom within late capitalist modernity is therefore little more than the
freedom to consume, and the culture industry depends upon and reinforces
this mind-set by promulgating the story that anyone can “make it” in society,
through hard work and capitulation to the system. Consumption itself has
even become a patriotic value with a slogan that anyone can become suc-
cessful and prosperous. Horkheimer and Adorno’s description of the culture
industry is likewise hyperbolic. The vast majority of mass media news does
seem insufficient in informing consumers with news in a historical, global,
and multi-political context, that is, news appropriate to informing a rational
citizen of a liberal democratic state. The remedy is not to rid oneself of logos
as that would be as equally ridiculous as a society built upon mere logos.
There is an alternative. If, by and large, the culture industry is a prod-
uct of the ubiquitous employment of instrumental reason, then the remedy
involves a role for a more robust concept of reason that has a special role for
myth and humour. Given that the first type of mass media is arguably the
printing press, and that Horkheimer and Adorno were writing a book that
would indeed be distributed by means of the mass production and distribu-
tion afforded by the publishing industry, it will seem that maybe the joke is
on the reader. Dialectic of Enlightenment rewards reading and reconstruct-
ing rationally in order to conclude that rationality gives rise to oppression.
In the next section, we will suggest that although society seems to regard
instrumental reason as its foundation, and as a foundation it has been found
wanting, a more robust sense of reason even within the iron system is perhaps
made possible by humour, specifically reconciled humour.
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V. HUMOUR, MYTH, IMAGINATION AND FREEDOM
The role of a more robust sense of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialec-
tic of Enlightenment is motivated by the shortcomings of a society dedicated
to instrumental reason alone. To figure out what mythos or myth’s role should
be and how it could be a complementary force, we can follow the criticisms
implied by the reductio ad absurdum argument. If reason means subsuming
particulars to universals at the cost of the uniqueness and individuality of
the particular experience, myth provides a corrective by deploying metaphors
which purposively do not try for a veridical representation of reality. If sub-
sumptive reason presumes to offer a mirror of the world, mythic imagination
highlights not only the image but also the act of reflecting. If reason aims at
certainty and scientific knowledge, myth strives for practical or ethical knowl-
edge. The use of myth assuages the dehumanizing excesses of instrumental
reason. The corrective qualities of mythos for culture—within the combina-
tion of myth and reason—can realize the promises of the Enlightenment.
In rather poetic language, using Odysseus as a paradigmatic case of mythol-
ogy, Horkheimer and Adorno reveal how myth itself functions. In more gen-
eral terms, mythic imagination functions by the recognition that it is pretend
or more precisely, that it is both self-referential and non-veridical or in other
words, it eschews the idea of a mere mirror of reality. Myth, therefore, is
epistemically responsible for its ontological status in the imagination. More-
over, myth is inherently bound up with ethos or a culture’s civilized life, and
in so doing, grants knowledge which benefits community life. Horkheimer
and Adorno use the Homeric myth of Odysseus to illustrate this point: “In
reality Odysseus, the subject, denies his own identity, which makes him a
subject, and preserves his life by mimicking the amorphous realm. He calls
himself nobody because “Polyphemus” is not a self, and confusion of the name
with the thing prevents the duped barbarian from escaping the trap”.30 This
passage can be read as emblematic of the three features that allow mythic
imagination to complement reason: a) it is self-referential or meta-analytical,
b) non-veridical and c) practical as it grants knowledge about civic life. It is
self-referential in so far as Odysseus refers to himself paradoxically as “not a
self” and in so far as it is about what to call the self. It is non-veridical as
Odysseus is not named “Polyphemus,” and this convenient misrepresentation
saves his life. These features complement reason because they depend upon
reason’s power to making meaning while highlighting its shortcomings.
Given Horkheimer and Adorno’s account, the mythic imagination com-
plements Enlightenment reason, and in fact is parasitic on Enlightenment’s
logos for its folly. Our getting the joke of Odysseus’ name turns on there be-
ing conventions which are up-ended. “With advancing Enlightenment, only
authentic works of art have been able to avoid the mere imitation of what
already is”.31 There is an irony in calling oneself by a name that means “not
a self” in order to preserve one’s life. There is a rupture with the so-called
totality of Enlightenment reasoning. This use of irony, which calls attention
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to the sometimes hollowness of language, gives rise to laughter. “Laughter,
whether reconciled or terrible, always accompanies the moment when fear is
ended. It indicates a release, whether from physical danger or from the grip
of logic”.32
Following the description of Odysseus, Horkheimer and Adorno write,“[t]he
ambiguity of laughter is closely related to that of name; perhaps names are
nothing more than petrified laughter, as nicknames still are—the only ones
in which the original act of name-giving still persists. Laughter is in league
with the guilt of subjectivity, but in the suspension of law which it announces
it also points beyond that complicity”.33 The act of name giving is analogous
to their concerns about subsumptive reason violating the particular, the par-
ticular here meaning a specific person. On their account, nicknames retain
some of the sensuous particularity not inherent in “generic” names such as
Mary and Mike. When a person designates another person with a nickname,
the two in the exchange most likely will know why the name was chosen, and
thus through the act of nicknaming have a more intimate connection to that
reason particular to their experience. For Horkheimer and Adorno, then the
use of generic names is simply an instance of instrumental rationality, whereas
the act of giving nicknames is self-referential, non-veridical, and practical—it
requires an imaginative act.
On their account, this same dynamic is present with laughter. The double
edges of laughter for Horkheimer and Adorno are: reconciled or good laughter
and terrible or bad laughter. Terrible laughter, the mechanical laughter of the
laugh track, is a tool of the culture industry. Laugh tracks are needed because
“there is nothing to laugh at;” the audience must be tutored, their emotional
response coaxed.34 Since the culture industry is predicated on instrumental
rationality which has the potential to stunt the mythic imagination, terrible
laughter is a “medicinal bath which the entertainment industry never ceases
to prescribe”.35 That is, it allows us to cope with a rationally assimilated
life “by defecting to the agencies which inspire it. It echoes the inescapa-
bility of power”.36 This is not a reflective laughter, but a knee-jerk laughter
that “makes laughter the instrument of cheating happiness”.37 However, ter-
rible laughter can make way for reconciled laughter. Horkheimer and Adorno
claim that “if laughter up to now has been a sign of violence, an outbreak of
blind, obdurate nature, it nevertheless contains the opposite element, in that
through laughter the blind nature becomes aware of itself as such and thus
abjures its destructive violence”.38 Reconciled laughter is a mythic laughter—
it “resounds with the echo of the escape from power”.39 “Laughter about
something is always laughter at it, and the vital force, according to Bergson,
bursts through rigidity in laughter is, in truth, the irruption of barbarity,
the self-assertion which, in convivial setting, dares to celebrate its liberation
from scruple”.40 Reconciled humour revels in the fact that “res severa verum
gaudium” or true joy is a serious thing.41
304
Sheryl Tuttle Ross
Aaron Golec
It is at this point that we can read the text itself, Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment, as an exercise in conciliatory laughter. The fragments are a combination
of instrumental reason and mythic imagination. Horkheimer and Adorno use
reason against reason while being provocative. If we interpret their hyper-
bole, then we can see how they are poking-fun at reason while simultaneously
using it. It can be read as a bit tongue in cheek—true joy is a serious thing.
In order to truly enjoy the text, one must try to use reason to make sense of
it, but of course it is written in a way that frustrates reason. We can interpret
the hyperbole in their descriptions of Enlightenment thinking as functioning
humorously, and as being a parody of philosophy: a self-referential example
of the type of humour that in fact can escape the so-called totality of En-
lightenment rationality. The self-reference points to the content and to the
process of representing, and as such does not mistake itself for telling the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, and further their critique of the cul-
ture industry grants knowledge that should serve as a corrective to current
practices. One might interpret Dialectic of Enlightenment itself as an exercise
in integral freedom. That is, it provides a speculative unity—the text itself
is intentionally difficult so that it resists closure—between the universal and
the particular, the high and the low, the transcendent and the immanent, and
as such invites citizens of liberal democratic states to regard themselves as
something more than consumers. Moreover, such an account is open to the
possibility that it is through the culture industry that the iron system might
loosen its grip. The qualities that allow for speculative unity can present
themselves in both low and high art. To be clear, it is not that mass art as
a category because of its being mass art holds this potential, but only mass
art that features the interplay of both mythos and logos which may give rise
to reconciled laughter.
An example might make this point clearer. In the aftermath of the
9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, many Americans were left wondering whether
any sort of humour would be appropriate or whether it was an end to irony.
The prevalent idea is that the only rational response to such devastation is to
wallow in its enormity. Moreover, the plans for the attacks demonstrated the
power of instrumental reason and how the products of modernity are indeed
double-edged. One humorous response was deftly displayed by The Onion’s
infamous headline “God Angrily Clarifies Don’t Kill Rule” on September 26,
2001. The idea that those who attacked the U.S. did so as if it were God’s will
is a meta-level description that refers to the horrible attacks without directly
doing so. Of course, it is non-veridical as God held no such press conference;
however this does not detract from the catharsis that The Onion’s headline
provided in its practical role as an outlet for the rage and grief engendered by
the destruction. There were concerns voiced about how one can be funny in
the aftermath of such devastation. But as Horkheimer and Adorno recognize,
“through laughter the blind nature becomes aware of itself as such and thus
abjures its destructive violence”.42 The satiric combination of mythos and lo-
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gos confronted the worst of the human experience. The humour on display
in The Onion was not terrible humour as it was not the sort of laugh-track
response that aimed to sell a product. Satire in this sense is re-claiming its
role as social critic and comforter. It recognizes the trauma inherent in in-
strumental reason in order to move beyond it. Reconciled humour must use
reason as self-referential or meta-analytic, and it must not be a simple reduc-
tion or representation of a state of affairs, instead it aims to transcend the
mere collection of facts that sometimes counts as knowledge to be beyond the
veridical. Finally, in doing so, reconciled humour rendering reconciled laugh-
ter provides the critical distance for escaping the traps lay bare by a culture
industry built upon instrumental reason. While such an account of humour
may seem commonplace, given some of the successes of postmodernism, the
observations about the power of humour in Horkheimer and Adorno predate
it, and are important in the way they conceive of both the power and the
limitations of instrumental reason. This is not irony for irony’s sake, but
rather an exercise in freedom.43
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